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1 Introduction
Consider a small open economy that cannot commit to repay debt but faces output losses
if it decides to default. Provided the domestic marginal productivity of capital is greater
than the prevailing world interest rates, it is mutually beneficial for foreign creditors to
lend and the domestic government to borrow. Creditors will lend up to the incentive
compatible level of debt – beyond which greater debt triggers default. Moreover, if
the economy is subject to shocks, the incentive compatible level of debt fluctuates with
economic conditions. In this paper I study the optimal debt contract in this world; get
results on the level of debt it prescribes and the size of optimal debt relief in response to
diﬀerent types of economic shocks; and compare the results to real world outcomes.
Models with endogenous decision of debt repayment and capital accumulation are not
very tractable analytically. However, for some limiting cases, I can derive analytical
solutions for the level of debt and debt relief. The method consists of taking first order
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approximations of the Bellman equations. The obtained formulae are simple and intuitive.
I also solve the model numerically for non-limiting cases and show that the formulae are
good approximations.
In the optimal contract, repayment is contingent on the state: the country is often
paying a default premium on its borrowing and, when a negative shock occurs, its debt
is reduced to an amount that is incentive compatible to repay. Such contingencies allow
the country to exhaust its borrowing possibilities and therefore bring first-order gains to
the world by transferring capital to an economy with higher marginal productivity.
It is important to understand the extent to which real world capital movements are
mimicking an optimal arrangement. If observed sovereign default episodes can be seen as
contingencies of optimal international lending contracts, then the ineﬃciencies of default
are only arising from the costs of debt renegotiation.1 Therefore, policies should aim at
reducing such costs, either by facilitating the renegotiation process or by designing explic-
itly contingent contracts. Otherwise, restrictions on foreign borrowing or the imposition
of capital controls may be welfare enhancing.2
I begin with a deterministic model that yields the main results concerning the level
of debt and capital flows in this economy. Countries borrow to speed convergence to
their steady state levels of capital and, as there is no uncertainty, there is no default in
equilibrium. The debt-GDP ratio depends positively on the output cost of defaulting and
growth prospects but negatively on world interest rates.
Once I move to a model with uncertainty, occasional debt relief is obtained as an
equilibrium outcome. If the domestic marginal productivity of capital exceeds world
interest rates, increasing borrowing yields first-order gains. Borrowing is maximized when
the amount of debt equals its incentive compatible level at all future states. Debt reduction
occurs when the economy switches to a state with a lower incentive compatible level of
debt.
Debt relief predicted by the model depends positively on the magnitude of the shocks
and the persistence of states, but ambiguously on the level of capital.3 Importantly, the
output cost of defaulting, a variable which is diﬃcult to measure, has no significant eﬀect
on debt relief (as a fraction of the outstanding debt).
Debt reduction generated by reasonable fluctuations in productivity is an order of
magnitude below that generated by shocks to world interest rates. This result builds on
1Krueger (2002) argues that the absence of an orderly process for renegotiating sovereign debt has a number of costs
because it delays or even inhibits agreements on a needed restructuring.
2Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004) argue in favor of policies that limit the ability of poor countries to contract debt.
3 In the numerical examples, debt relief depends negatively on the level of capital.
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the observation that a change in interest rates from 1% to 2% doubles the cost of servicing
debt while a 5% fall in productivity reduces by just 5% the cost of not repaying. The
small eﬀect of productivity fluctuations and the large eﬀect of shocks to world interest
rates on debt default are consistent with empirical evidence (Tomz and Wright, 2007 and
Uribe and Yue, 2006) although most of the recent literature on debt and default focuses
on productivity shocks.
The eﬀects of such shocks on the incentive compatible level of debt do not depend on
whether debt contracts are contingent or not. Therefore, shocks to world interest rates
would generate more incentives for default than productivity fluctuations in models with
uncontingent bonds as well.
I then use data from the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980’s to compare the
predictions of the model to the observed debt relief. I find that the increase in world
interest rates at the beginning of the 1980’s can individually account for more than half
of the debt relief obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady
agreements. If the marginal productivity of capital in Latin America was higher than in
the developed world in the 1970’s, then a substantial debt reduction following the increase
in US interest rates would have been part of an optimal contract drawn up in the 1970’s.4
The model builds on the literature of endogenous sovereign debt and default (Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981), Arellano (2007)).5 Two important features of this paper are worth
stressing: (i) the analysis of the optimal debt contract; and (ii) the focus on the eﬀects of
capital flows in terms of growth instead of risk sharing.
One of the key assumptions in this model is that if the country repudiates its debt,
it is excluded from capital markets and incurs an output loss.6 The assumption of an
output loss is a simple way of modelling the implicit costs to a country that defaults.
Debt repudiation inhibits foreign direct investment and undermines a country’s capacity
to obtain beneficial deals in multi-lateral organisations such as the WTO. In addition,
creditors can threaten countries that might repudiate debt with sanctions such as the loss
of access to short-term trade credit and seizure of assets.7
In reality, however, observed punishment for default is both tame and temporary.
4The welfare implications of borrowing depend on the diﬀerences in marginal productivity of capital. Caselli and Feyrer
(2007) find that the marginal productivity of capital was indeed higher in poor countries in the 1970’s. In the context of
the Latin American debt crisis, the task of measuring productivity of capital is complicated by the fact that a substantial
part of the debt went to financing government investment, often in infrastructure, on which return is not easily measured.
5 It is also related to the literature on consumers’ and firms’ debt. In particular, the optimal contract in this model bears
resemblance to that in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004).
6The output cost of debt repudiation, as modeled here, is present in Cohen and Sachs (1986), Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989),
Arellano (2007) and Wright (2002), to name a few.
7See Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989) for a discussion of such costs.
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Following a negative shock, creditors have an incentive to renegotiate debt down to a level
where it is incentive compatible for the country to repay. So contracts are contingent de
facto even if not written as such. Indeed, default premia are regularly paid and partial
defaults sometimes occur.
Instead of modelling the renegotiation process,8 I derive the optimal contingent debt
contracts.9 All results are derived from the point of a view of a benevolent domestic
government.10 In the model, it is never optimal to renege on the contract, so the output
cost is never paid in equilibrium, but premium rates on borrowing and occasional debt
reduction are observed.
The results are normative benchmarks but such implicit contracts can be implemented
in practice. In fact, the optimal contract yields the same results as the assumption that
lenders have all the bargaining power – a usual implicit assumption in the literature –
and they promptly agree to debt relief if it is optimal for them.
The study of external debt and default is closely related to the question of why capital
does not flow from rich to poor countries. One proposed explanation is that the risk
of default prevents larger capital inflows in emerging economies (Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
(2004) and Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savastano (2003)). Alternative explanations emphasise
diﬀerences in productivity (Lucas (1990)) and question whether the marginal productivity
of capital is really higher in poor countries (Caselli and Feyrer (2007)).11 Yet, most of the
recent work on debt and default building on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) focuses on risk
sharing.12 Cohen and Sachs (1986) present a growth model in which debt is repaid only
if it is incentive compatible to do so, but assume a linear production function and have
no uncertainty.13
8Renegotiation in models of sovereign debt is studied by Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989), Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) and
Yue (2005). Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007) study the return from debt overhang to the credit market.
9 Sovereign debt was also analysed as an (implicitly) contingent claim by Grossman and Van Huyck (1988), Atkinson
(1991) and Calvo and Kaminsky (1991) among others. Grossman and Van Huyck show that an equilibrium in which
“excusable” default is allowed without sanctions can be sustained. Alfaro and Kanczuk’s (2005) quantitative analysis builds
on Grossman and Van Huyck. Calvo and Kaminsky (1991) take the optimal contract approach to study whether the small
default premium paid by Latin American countries in the 1970’s would be compatible with large debt reductions in the
1980’s.
10 In the standard Ramsey model, the central planner solution and the decentralised equilibrium are the same. However,
that is not true without commitment to repay debt. The distinction between the central planner solution and the decen-
tralised allocation is analysed by Kehoe and Perri (2004) and Jeske (2006). Kehoe and Perri (2004) show that the central
planner solution can be decentralised if the central government is in charge of deciding about defaulting or not and taxes
capital income to counteract an externality of capital accumulation. The logic behind Jeske’s argument is similar and he
finds that capital controls may be welfare improving.
11 See also Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006).
12Arellano (2007), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Yue (2005) study the relation between default risk and macroeconomic
variables in endowment economies. In such models, the government is assumed to be substantially more impatient than
the outside world, otherwise the equilibrium level of debt is too small and default is a rare phenomenon.
13Cohen and Sachs (1986) also analyse a numerical example with decreasing returns to capital which is basically the same
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2 Deterministic Model
In this section, I consider a deterministic, discrete time model of an open economy that
can borrow from abroad, but cannot commit to repay its debts.
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived agents whose preferences
are aggregated to form the usual representative agent utility function:
∞X
t=0
βtu(ct)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective time discount factor, ct is consumption at time t and
u(.) is the felicity function that satisfies the Inada conditions.
I model debt default costs as an instantaneous permanent fall in productivity and loss
of access to capital markets. The permanent fall specifically captures the loss that a
country suﬀers by taking an antagonistic position towards the rest of the world and never
repaying its debts. In the model this is out-of-equilibrium behaviour, which corresponds
to never observing such action in reality. For this reason, it is diﬃcult to obtain an
estimate of the costs; nevertheless I expect it to be a small fraction of GDP.
Output in the economy is a function of the level of capital, as labour is normalised
to 1. In the deterministic case, the productivity parameter, A, is constant over time. I
denote by γ the fraction of output lost due to default, so production is given by:
yt =
(
A.f(kt) , if no default
A(1− γ).f(kt) , if default
There is a continuum of risk-neutral lenders that, in equilibrium, lend to the country
as long as the expected return on their assets is not lower than the risk-free interest rate
in international markets, r∗. The price of a bond that delivers one unit of the good next
period with certainty, (1 + r∗)−1, will be denoted q∗ and q∗ = β. There is a maximum
amount of debt the country can contract that prevents it from running Ponzi schemes but
it is never reached in equilibrium.
The economy’s flow budget constraint is then given by:
ct + kt+1 =
(
A.f(kt) + (1− δ)kt − dt + qtdt+1 , if no default
A(1− γ).f(kt) + (1− δ)kt , if default
Where qt is the (endogenously determined) price of debt and δ is the depreciation rate.
The focus here is sovereign debt, so I analyse the central planner solution to maximise
the representative agent’s utility function subject to the economy’s budget constraint.
as my deterministic model. Marcet and Marimon (1992), Kehoe and Perri (2004), Wright (2002) and Bai and Zhang (2005)
also study economies with capital accumulation.
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In each period, the central planner chooses between repaying or defaulting. Each option
yields a diﬀerent value function and the planner chooses the maximum of the two:
V (k, d) = max {Vpay(k, d), Vdef (k, γ)}
Where:
Vpay(k, d) = max
k0,d0
{u(Af(k) + (1− δ)k − k0 − d+ qd0) + βV (k0, d0)}
Vdef(k, γ) = max
k0
{u((1− γ)Af(k) + (1− δ)k − k0) + βVdef (k0)}
I assume that decisions about k0 and d0 are made simultaneously and lenders can
observe k0 before taking their lending decisions (or condition their decisions on k0). As
noted by Cohen and Sachs (1986), the country would otherwise have an incentive to
borrow d0 but then invest less, consume more and default on its debt.14
An equilibrium is a {kt}∞t=0 , {dt}∞t=0 and {qt}∞t=0 such that the central planner max-
imises the value function V (k, d) at every period and lenders are indiﬀerent between the
domestic and risk-free bond.
The following results hold in an equilibrium with no uncertainty:
1. q = q∗, a constant. As there is no uncertainty, q = q∗ if the country will repay
and q = 0 otherwise. The choice d0 = 0 is strictly better than any choice d0 such
that q = 0 because that yields the same amount of consumption today and more
production next period (by avoiding the γAf(k) output loss). So, in equilibrium, I
obtain the no-default condition: Vpay(k, d) ≥ Vdef (k, γ).
2. dmax(k, γ) is the maximum level of incentive compatible debt and is increasing in γ.
Since by diﬀerentiating the value function we obtain that Vpay is decreasing in d and
Vdef is decreasing in γ, Vpay(k, dmax) = Vdef (k, γ). Thus, an increase in γ implies an
increase in dmax(k, γ).
3. If k0 is below the steady state level of capital, k∗, then d0 = dmax. In the steady state,
k0 = k = k∗ and the marginal productivity of capital, mpk = Af 0(k∗)− δ, equals the
marginal cost of renting an extra unit of capital, r∗. In this case, the country has
no incentive to change the level of its debt, because capital is at the optimal level
and smooth consumption can be achieved by always choosing d0 = d. In contrast,
if k < k∗, mpk > r∗ and d cannot be smaller than dmax, otherwise the no-default
14To see this, note that in the optimal plan Vpay(k0, d0) = Vdef (k0, γ) and u0(c) = β
∂Vpay
∂k0 (k
0, d0). But ∂Vpay∂k0 (k
0, d0) >
∂Vdef
∂k0 (k
0), so if the country has already borrowed d0 and hasn’t committed to k0, a marginal decrease in k0 leads to an
increase in today’s utility that is bigger than the decrease in tomorrow’s value. This moral hazard problem is studied by
Atkeson (1991).
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condition would not bind, so the country could borrow an extra unit at r∗, invest it
and obtain a greater return than r∗ next period.
4. If γ = 0 , no debt can be sustained. If γ = 0, any positive discounted stream of
repayment is worse than defaulting, so the maximum incentive compatible positive
discounted stream of repayment is zero.15
5. If γ = 1, we obtain full commitment. If γ = 1 with no default, in the steady state,
the country obtains consumption equal to Af(k∗) − δk∗ − r∗d∗ which is positive
because d∗ ≤ k∗, Af 0(k∗) − δ = r∗ and f(k∗) > k∗f 0(k∗). Hence the first best, full
commitment equilibrium is incentive compatible.16
Using these results, I now derive the path of debt in the neighbourhood of γ = 0. I
will detail two observations that are used to derive it.
First, consider k0p and d
0 such that Vpay(k0p, d
0) = Vdef (k0p, γ) and k
0
p ≤ k∗. Then
there exists some k ≤ k0p and d such that the country is indiﬀerent between “repaying
and choosing (k0p, d
0)” and “defaulting and choosing (k0d)”. The value functions will be
equivalent in this case. The value functions are given by:
Vpay(k, d) = max
k0p,d0
©
u(y + (1− δ)k − k0p − d+ qd0) + βVpay(k0p, d0)
ª
Vdef (k, γ) = max
k0d
{u((1− γ)y + (1− δ)k − k0d) + βVdef (k0d, γ)}
Second, from result 4, we know that the value functions when γ = d = d0 = 0 are
identical and have a common optimal level of capital:
V0(k) = max
k0
{u(y + (1− δ)k − k0) + βVdef (k0, 0)}
= max
k0
{u(y + (1− δ)k − k0) + βVpay(k0, 0)}
Then, from result 3, we always have d0 = dmax and therefore the no default condition
will always bind: Vpay(k, dmax) = Vdef (k, γ). Using the first observation, we rewrite these
value functions in the form above. Then by taking a linear approximation of Vpay(k, d)
and Vdef(k, γ) around V0(k) and manipulating the linearised expressions, we can find d
and γ that equate Vpay(k, d) and Vdef (k, γ) without solving for the value functions. The
expression for d turns out to be a good approximation for its true value if γ is not more
than a few percentage points. This is because when γ → 0, the optimal choice of capital
15This result is due to the absence of uncertainty in the model. It has already been shown in the literature that, with
uncertainty, there may be debt in equilibrium even in the absence of output costs (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981).
16Again, this is a result due to the absence of uncertainty in the model. It has already been shown in the literature
that with uncertainty and incomplete asset markets, the full commitment equilibrium may not be the first best equilibrium
because the possibility of default makes debt somewhat contingent (Zame, 1993).
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is independent of the decision about defaulting – which allows us to get the analytical
results. As γ moves away from 0, that is no longer true, however the impact on the value
function of reoptimising the level of capital due to a 1% or 2% fall in productivity is very
small, and so is its impact on the maximum incentive compatible level of debt.
The results do not depend on functional forms of the utility function or the production
function, these would only have second order eﬀects.
Proposition 1 In this economy, for a very small γ:
1. In steady state:
d∗ =
γy∗
1− q∗ (1)
2. For yt < y∗:
dt+1
yt
=
γ
1− q +
∆dt+1
(1− q)yt
and:
dt = q.dt+1 + (1− q)
γyt
1− q
Proof: see appendix.
This result will allow us to determine the path for debt in the economy, given a path
for output.
Part (1) of the proposition shows that in the steady state, the country keeps repaying
its debt if the interest payment, d∗(1− q∗), is not greater than the output loss, γy∗, due
to default. The debt as proportion of GDP is, as a first order approximation, equal to
γ/(1−q∗). Positive debt with no uncertainty arises in equilibrium to finance convergence.
If γ = 1% and q∗ = 0.98 (r∗ ≈ 2%), the debt-GDP ratio is 50%.
The level of debt is proportional to the output loss and inversely proportional to the
risk-free interest rate. Note that a change in interest rate from 1% to 2% has the same
impact on d as a decrease of 50% in GDP. Fluctuations in interest rates from 1% to 2%
are much more common than a 50% fall in output.
Part (2) of the proposition shows that for yt < y∗, the condition for default reduces to
a comparison between output losses and resources paid to foreign agents in the present
period. But the increase in debt is endogenously determined by considering that the
country will be indiﬀerent in the next period between repaying and defaulting – so,
ultimately, debt at period t is obtained by backward induction from the steady state level
of debt.
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For yt < y∗, the absolute level of debt is increasing over time because the present value
of the output loss due to default is increasing as output rises to its steady state level. The
debt-GDP ratio is decreasing over time. This is because positive capital inflows generate
more incentive for the country to repay, and capital inflows are decreasing over time.17
The proposition also shows that in equilibrium, the country must experience net out-
flows of resources on the way to convergence. Debt is increasing (financial account is in
surplus) but such increase is smaller than the interest paid in its debt. So, even though
the current account is in deficit, the country is a net exporter of goods.
2.1 Numerical solution
In the numerical examples of this paper, specific utility and production functional forms
are assumed as follows:
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ , f(k) = k
α
I calibrate the specific parameters as follows: one period corresponds to one year.
A = 1, α = 0.36, β = 1.02−1, σ = 3 and δ = 0.10. The price of a riskless bond, q∗ , equals
β. The productivity loss in terms of default, γ = 0.01.
The numerical solution is obtained through value function iteration. The state space
is discretised using grids for debt and capital but the planner can choose any point in the
grid. From Figure 1, the numbers obtained in this solution are very similar to those from
the analytical formulae using the path of yt given by the numerical example.
Figure 1 also shows the behavior of capital in this economy, γ = 0.01, compared to
the closed-economy case, γ = 0, and the full-commitment open-economy case, γ = 1.
Without the possibility of default, the level of capital jumps to its steady state level and
the marginal productivity of capital equals r∗ in one period. The possibility of default
makes convergence slower. Due to the initial capital inflow, the level of capital is higher
in this economy than in the closed economy case until they converge. However, the closed
economy slowly catches up, as the open economy will be experiencing net capital outflows
(trade balance surpluses) during the whole history, as shown at Figure 1. Debt stabilises
at 51% of GDP but reaches 60% of GDP at earlier stages.
A usual intuition is that financially open economies should converge faster to their
steady states (Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). In contrast, the equilibrium from
this model shows that an indebted open economy would take more time to converge than
a closed economy with the same level of capital. After the initial capital inflow, the
country experiences net outflows of resources i.e. a positive trade balance. In addition, a
17This eﬀect appears already in a numerical example in Cohen and Sachs (1986).
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closed economy that opens to capital flows would not converge significantly faster but, on
the way towards the steady state, would have higher output than if it remained closed.
In order to experience faster convergence, emerging economies need trade deficits and, as
Proposition 1 shows, that does not occur in equilibrium.
Figure 1: Deterministic model
The steady state level of debt as a first order approximation is given by γ/r∗, so γ = 1%
and r∗ = 2% yield a steady state level of debt equal to half of the country’s GDP. Models
based on risk sharing and endowment economies (Arellano (2007), Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006)) predict lower levels of debt than we observe in reality, even when assuming very
low values of β. If debt is issued to buy capital and finance convergence, substantially
higher levels of debt are obtained.
3 The stochastic model
In order to study default, this section introduces uncertainty in the analysis. Two sto-
chastic versions of the model are considered: (1) stochastic r∗ and (2) stochastic A.
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There are 2 possible states, st ∈ {h, l}, and the probability of switching states is ψ:
Pr(st = h|st−1 = l) = Pr(st = l|st−1 = h) = ψ, ψ < 0.5. As before, the country can issue
only one-period uncontingent debt.18
In a stochastic world, the incentive compatible level of debt fluctuates. If debt goes
above its incentive compatible level, the debtor prefers not to repay it. But then, both
creditors and debtors have incentives to renegotiate it. Here, I solve for the optimal con-
tingent contract, which provides the normative benchmark: the level of debt is contingent
on the state. The optimal contract can be implemented if creditors immediately reduce
the level of debt to its incentive compatible level when it goes above it.
I follow the literature (Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Arellano (2007)) and assume that
the debtor fully repays debt provided it is incentive compatible to do so. As noted by
Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990), we are assuming that all bargaining power lies with the
creditors. In this model, creditors are always able to extract the maximum incentive com-
patible payment from the lenders, so the assumption about bargaining power is internally
consistent.19
If the country wants to borrow as much as it can then, in order to expand its borrowing
possibilities, it chooses to make debt in each of the future states as high as possible,
respecting the incentive compatibility constraints. Thus the contingent contract has not
only second moment benefits but, more importantly, brings first order eﬃciency gains
by increasing the amount of resources transferred to the country with higher marginal
productivity of capital.
3.1 Stochastic world interest rates
Here, I analyse the optimal debt contract for an economy with fluctuations in world
interest rates, r∗, which leads to fluctuations in the price of risk-free debt, q∗. The
technology level, A, is fixed. The contract specifies the country’s debt at each possible
state, and the country has the choice between honouring its debt and defaulting.
The price of a riskless bond in international markets is q∗h in the high state and q∗l
in the low state, q∗h > q∗l. A risk-neutral creditor that lends q∗d0 must get an expected
repayment equal to d0. Denote by dh and dl the repayment conditional on high and low
state, respectively, and ∆d = dh− dl. If st−1 = h, a country that borrowed q∗hd0 has debt
18Foley-Fisher (2007) applies the method developed in this paper to study the eﬀect of terms of trade shocks on the
incentive compatible level of debt.
19Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) analyse the bargaining process and show that, in some situations, the creditor indeed
holds all the bargaining power. Hence, this assumption is justified, even though diﬀerences in our models, in particular
their assumption of a single creditor, mean that their results cannot be automatically transferred to this setting.
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dh if st = h and dl if st = l such that dh(1 − ψ) + dlψ = d0. Hence, dh = d0 + ψ∆d and
dl = d0 − (1− ψ)∆d. If st−1 = l, a country borrowing q∗ld0 has debt dh if st = h and dl if
st = l such that dl(1 − ψ) + dhψ = d0. Hence, dl = d0 − ψ∆d and dh = d0 + (1 − ψ)∆d.
Thus the country is choosing, at every state, one extra variable, ∆d. The value functions
conditional on repayment are:
V hpay(k, d) = max
k0,d0,∆d
©
u(c) + β
£
(1− ψ)V h(k0, d0 + ψ∆d) + ψV l(k0, d0 − (1− ψ)∆d)
¤ª
V lpay(k, d) = max
k0,d0,∆d
©
u(c) + β
£
(1− ψ)V l(k0, d0 − ψ∆d) + ψV h(k0, d0 + (1− ψ)∆d)
¤ª
where c = Af(k)+(1−δ)k−k0−d+qi(k0, d0)d0, V i(k, d) = max
©
V ipay(k, d), V
i
def(k, γ)
ª
and i ∈ {l, h}.
In case of default, the value function in both states is:
Vdef (k, γ) = max
k0
{u((1− γ)Af(k) + (1− δ)k − k0) + βVdef(k0, γ)}
It makes no diﬀerence whether foreign interest rates are low or high if the country is
excluded from international financial markets.
If contracts can be written and enforced contingent on q∗, debt repudiation is never
optimal, so dh and dl will always be incentive compatible. A contract specifying no debt in
one of the states is strictly better than the case of repudiating debt at that state because,
given that the expected payment must be the same, the debt payments in the alternative
state will be identical so the only diﬀerence between the cases will be the loss in output
when debt is repudiated.
The optimal ∆d will depend on k, d and s. As in equilibrium there is no debt repu-
diation, V h = V hpay and V
l = V lpay. However, the optimal ∆d depends on whether the
borrowing constraint is binding or not, that is, whether the country would borrow more
in the absence of commitment problems.
Proposition 2 If the borrowing constraint is not binding, ∆d is chosen to make
∂V hpay(k
0, dh)
∂d
=
∂V lpay(k
0, dl)
∂d
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 3 If the borrowing constraint is binding, so that mpk > r∗i, and q∗h− q∗l is
arbitrarily small, then ∆d is chosen to make V hpay(k
0, dh) = V lpay(k
0, dl).
Where mpk = Af 0(k)− δ and r∗i = 1/q∗i − 1.
If the country’s borrowing constraint is not binding, ∆d is chosen to equate the mar-
ginal value functions in both states. When the constraint is binding, the optimal contract
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equates the value functions in both states in order to ensure there are no further gains
from transferring debt across states. If V hpay(k
0, dh) and V lpay(k
0, dl) do not coincide, the
country can always borrow more by transferring debt across states. In equilibrium, if the
borrowing constraint is binding, V hpay(k
0, dh) = V lpay(k
0, dl) = Vdef(k0, γ).
The binding borrowing constraint implies that the benefits of the optimal contract
are not related to risk-sharing, as they would be if the country were not constrained.
First-order benefits arise because transferring debt between states enables the country to
borrow more. As its marginal productivity of capital is greater than r∗, world output is
higher.
3.1.1 The value of ∆d
For analytical convenience, I consider that dq∗ = q∗h − q∗l is suﬃciently small and work
with linear approximations. By taking the linear approximations, we are not considering
the welfare eﬀects of reoptimising k, d and ∆d when the country changes state.
In addition, I temporarily consider an alternative process for q∗ that I denote by the
ξ-process, as opposed to the ψ-process that we described above. At time t = 0, q∗0 = q
∗ξ;
from time t = 1 on, there is a constant probability at each period that q∗ permanently
goes to q¯. So, for t > 0:
• if q∗t−1 = q∗ξ, Pr(q∗t = q∗ξ) = ξ and Pr(q∗t = q¯) = 1− ξ;
• if q∗t−1 = q¯, q∗t = q¯.
The value function at (k, d) if qt = q∗ξ is:
V ξ(k, d, q∗ξ) = max
k0,d0,d0ξ
©
u (c) + β
£
(1− ξ)V det(k0, d0) + ξV ξ(k0, d0ξ, q∗ξ)
¤ª
where c = Af(k)+(1−δ)k−k0−d+q∗ξ(d0(1−ξ)+ξd0ξ) and V det is the value function
in the model with no uncertainty.
The ξ-process and the ψ-process are related using the following lemma:
Lemma 4 Define q¯ = (q∗h + q∗l)/2 and denote by V h(k, d, q∗h) the value function at
(k, d, q∗h) in the case of the ψ-process. Then V h(k, d, q∗h) = V ξ(k, d, q∗h) if ξ = 1− 2ψ.
Proof: see appendix.
Compare the following two cases when q∗ follows the ξ-process: (1) q∗ = q∗ξ and debt
is dξ0 and (2) q
∗ = q¯ and debt is d0. We want to find the values of d
ξ
0 and d0 that make
the country indiﬀerent between both cases in order to determine ∆d using proposition
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3. By taking a linear approximation of V ξ(k, dξ, q∗ξ) around V det(k, d0) and using the
indiﬀerence condition that V ξ(k, dξ, q∗ξ) = V det(k, d0), we get the following lemma:
Lemma 5 The country’s indiﬀerence between both states, V ξ(k, dξ, q∗ξ) = V det(k, d0),
implies:
u0(c0)
³
dξ0 − d0
´
=
∞X
t=0
(βξ)t u0(ct)
¡
q∗ξ − q¯
¢
dt+1
+
∞X
t=0
(βξ)t
∙
u0(ct)q¯ + β
∂V (kt+1, dt+1)
∂d
¸
(dξt+1 − dt+1)
where dξt+1 is debt contracted at time t if q
∗
t = q
∗ξ and dt+1 is debt contracted at time t
if q∗t = q¯.
Proof: see appendix.
Suppose that q∗ξ > q¯. The first line in the above expression shows the utility cost
of having a higher debt. The second line shows the utility benefit of borrowing at a
lower rate, and takes into account the probability of borrowing at a cheaper rate in future
periods. The third term is the benefit of being able to borrow more due to the lower
interest rates. If the borrowing constraint is binding, then
u0(ct)q¯ > −β
∂V (kt+1, dt+1)
∂d
which means that the benefit of borrowing an extra unit this period is bigger than the
cost of having an extra unit of debt next period.
From Lemma 5, we can write:
dξ0 − d0
d0
>
∞X
t=0
(βξ)t
u0(ct)
u0(c0)
¡
qξ − q¯
¢ dt+1
d0
To simplify our understanding of this equation and to derive explicit analytical solu-
tions, it is convenient to consider this expression in the neighbourhood of the steady state.
In the numerical section, I will show that this is a reasonable approximation.
As k approaches k∗, this equation holds with equality because the borrowing constraint
stops binding, and ct and dt approach their steady state, constant, values. Taking this
limit:
dξ0 − d0
d0
=
qξ − q¯
1− βξ (2)
And that leads to the following proposition:
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Proposition 6 Consider a deterministic steady state around, k¯, d¯ and q¯, such that q∗h
and q∗l are close to q¯ and q¯ =
¡
q∗h + q∗l
¢
/2. Then, a linear approximation around the
steady state implies that V (k¯, dh, q∗h) = V
¡
k¯, dl, q∗l
¢
when:
dh − dl
d¯
=
q∗h − q∗l
1− β(1− 2ψ) (3)
where d¯ =
¡
dh + dl
¢
/2.
Proof: see appendix.
From Lemma 5 and Proposition 6, ∆d/d¯ depends on:
1. the magnitude of interest rate fluctuations;
2. the persistence of the interest rate process;
3. the current level of capital – and its marginal productivity.
Close to the steady state, the key variables for determining ∆d are the size of interest
rate fluctuations, q∗h − q∗l, and the persistence of the interest rate process. In the i.i.d.
case, ψ = 0.5, and dh − dl = d¯
¡
q∗h − q∗l
¢
, that is, the debt in the low state has to
decrease to exactly compensate the smaller borrowing. In the other extreme, ψ → 0,
dh− dl = d¯
¡
q∗h − q∗l
¢
/(1−β), that is, the debt reduction in the low state must be much
greater to compensate for the expected future loss brought on by the fall in q∗. Hence,
higher persistence implies higher diﬀerence between dh and dl.
The lower is the level of capital, the greater are the marginal productivity of capital
and the diﬀerence between u0(c)q¯ and −β ∂V (k0,d0)∂d , which contribute to increase ∆d: a
switch to the low state that prevents the country from borrowing is more punitive when
capital is lower. A lower level of capital also implies lower consumption and, therefore,
higher marginal utilities, so present consumption is more important and higher costs of
borrowing in the future are less relevant, which induces a decrease in ∆d. Lastly, a
higher ratio between future and present debt increases the importance of future costs of
borrowing, which induces an increase in ∆d. Thus the overall eﬀect cannot be deduced
from the formula. In the numerical examples, ∆d is slightly decreasing in k, implying the
eﬀect of the borrowing constraint predominates.
The output cost γ has no eﬀects on ∆d/d in the limiting case of small fluctuations, it
is just important to determine the level of debt.
The analysis has focused on the two-state case, but the same insights apply if we
consider more general processes. The next proposition considers the case of an auto-
regressive process for q∗.
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Proposition 7 Suppose that q∗ follows an AR(1) process:
q∗t+1 − q¯ = ζ(q∗t − q¯) + εt+1
and V ar(εt) is arbitrarily small. If the economy is close to its steady state (k ' k∗),
V (k, d1, q∗1) = V (k, d2, q∗2) for any {q∗1, q∗2} close to q¯ and {d1, d2} when:
d1 − d2
d¯
=
q∗1 − q∗2
1− βζ
where d¯ is the level of debt in the deterministic model when q = q¯.
Proof: see appendix.
3.2 Stochastic technology
In this section, I consider fixing the world interest rates at r∗ and allowing for fluctuations
in A. Productivity is Ah in the high state and Al in the low state, Ah > Al. A risk-neutral
creditor that lends q∗d0 must get an expected repayment equal to d0. Denote by dh and
dl the repayment conditional on high and low state, respectively, and ∆d = dh − dl. The
value functions conditional on repayment are:
V hpay(k, d) = max
k0,d0,∆d
©
u(ch) + β
£
(1− ψ)V h(k0, d0 + ψ∆d) + ψV l(k0, d0 − (1− ψ)∆d)
¤ª
V lpay(k, d) = max
k0,d0,∆d
©
u(cl) + β
£
ψV h(k0, d0 + (1− ψ)∆d) + (1− ψ)V l(k0, d0 − ψ∆d)
¤ª
where ci = Aif(k)+(1−δ)k−k0−d+q(k0, d0)d0, V i(k, d) = max
©
V ipay(k, d), V
i
def(k, γ)
ª
and i denotes the state. In case of default, the value functions are:
V hdef (k, γ) = max
k0
©
u((1− γ)Ahf(k) + (1− δ)k − k0 + β
£
(1− ψ)V hdef (k0, γ) + ψV ldef (k0, γ)
¤ª
V ldef (k, γ) = max
k0
©
u((1− γ)Alf(k) + (1− δ)k − k0 + β
£
(1− ψ)V ldef (k0, γ) + ψV hdef (k0, γ)
¤ª
As before, there is no debt repudiation in equilibrium and, if the country’s borrowing
constraint is binding, it chooses to borrow as much as it can by limiting debt at each
possible future state just enough to make it incentive compatible. This result is stated in
the following proposition:
Proposition 8 If the borrowing constraint is binding, so that mpk > r∗i, and Ah −Al is
arbitrarily small, then ∆d is chosen to make V hpay(k
0, dh) = V hdef (k
0, γ) and V lpay(k
0, dl) =
V ldef (k
0, γ).
Proof: see appendix.
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The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.
As before, we need to obtain an expression for ∆d. The analogy to Proposition 6 for
the case of stochastic technology requires the additional assumption that γ is arbitrarily
small and yields the following result:
Proposition 9 Consider a deterministic steady state, {k¯, d¯, A¯}, such that Ah and Al are
close to A¯ =
¡
Ah +Al
¢
/2. Then, for arbitrarily small γ, a linear approximation around
the steady state implies that V hpay(k
0, dh) = V hdef (k
0, γ) and V lpay(k
0, dl) = V ldef (k
0, γ) when:
dh − dl
d¯
=
(1− q∗)
1− β(1− 2ψ)
Ah −Al
A¯
(4)
where d¯ =
¡
dh + dl
¢
/2.
Proof: see appendix.
As before, larger fluctuations and more persistent states imply higher debt relief and
γ has no first order impact on ∆d/d¯.
3.3 Contrasting stochastic q∗ and stochastic A
In order to contrast debt relief in the cases of stochastic interest rates and technology,
we need to contrast the numerators of Equations 3 and 4, as the denominator is the
same. The key distinction is that in Equation 3 we have the diﬀerence between interest
rates in both states, while in Equation 4 we have the diﬀerence in productivity multiplied
by (1 − q∗), the present discounted interest rate. A reasonable range for the numerator
of Equation 3 (stochastic interest rates) is between 2% and 4%. On the other hand, a
reasonable range for productivity flucutations is 2-6%, which in combination with a range
of interest rates from 1% to 3% gives a range for the numerator of Equation 4 (stochastic
technology) of 0.02% to 0.2%. This is at least one order of magnitude below what we get
from fluctuations in world interest rates.
Fluctuations in q∗ alter the cost of servicing debt. Shocks to A change the present
value of losses due to default. Both these changes aﬀect the incentive compatible level of
debt and the amount of debt relief depends on how the incentive compatible level of debt
is aﬀected by fluctuations in A and q∗. There is a great distinction in quantitative eﬀects
of shocks to A and q∗ because an increase in world interest rates from 1% to 2% doubles
the cost of servicing debt while a 5% fall in productivity reduces by 5% the loss due to
default. The intuition for the diﬀerence in debt relief from Equations 3 and 4 is similar to
the reasons for the distinct impacts of A and q∗ in the incentive compatible level of debt
in the deterministic model (Equation 1 and Proposition 1).
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4 Contrasting the model with data
In this section, I constrast the predictions of the model with data from the Latin American
debt crisis of the 1980’s. I compute the optimal debt relief from the model’s analytical
approximations. I subsequently check the accuracy of these approximations using the
same data in numerical simulations. My results show that the interest rate shock at the
beginning of the 1980’s can account for a large part of the observed debt relief.
4.1 The Latin American debt crisis of the 1980’s
The Latin American crisis is particularly suited to evaluate the model’s predictions for
two reasons: (i) there is one important and easily measured shock, the strong increase in
US interest rates, that impacted many countries and (ii) given the nature of the loans at
that time, there was a clear distinction between foreign and domestic creditors. In other
crises, e.g., Argentina 2001-2, borrowing occurred mainly through bonds and it would be
diﬃcult to default only on foreigners (Broner, Martin and Ventura, 2006).
External shocks were important factors in the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980’s.
As noted by Diaz-Alejandro (1984), countries with diﬀerent policies and distinct economies
ended up in similar crises in the beginning of the 1980’s, facing problems that in 1979
would have been considered unlikely. One key external shock is the increase in US real
interest rates, shown in Figure 2 (from Dotsey et al, 2003). In contrast to the 1970’s when
real interest rates were around 0%, in the 1980’s they were around 4%.20
In the beginning of the 1980’s, the prices of Latin American bonds in secondary mar-
kets went down, capital flows to those economies dried or reverted and the fast process
of economic growth of the 1970’s stopped. After countless IMF missions, several debt
reschedules and some attempts of debt renegotiation (including the Baker Plan), came
the Brady agreements, starting in 1989. In the period between 1989 and 1994, most of
the main Latin American countries got some debt relief. Table 1 shows the debt relief
following the Brady Plan agreements as a percentage of the outstanding long term debt in
the main Latin American countries. With the exception of Venezuela, at 20%, the other
four countries are around 30%.21
20There are other cases in which interest rate increases in the US contributed to crises in other countries. The sharp
increase in US interest rates in 1994, for example, is sometimes mentioned as one of the factors that led Mexico close to
defaulting in December 1994.
21As noted by Cline (1995), the initial approach for dealing with the problem of debt overhang was aimed both at reducing
debt and providing new loans, but “for practical purposes the Brady Plan has been all forgiveness and no new money”
(Cline, 1995, page 236). Indeed, according to the model, if the amount of debt exceeds its incentive compatible level, new
money will not be made available.
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Figure 2: US real interest rates
As the Brady agreements did not cover all forms of external debt, the figures in Table
1 should be seen as upper bounds (Cline, 1995).
In the model, the optimal contract prescribes automatic instantaneous debt relief in
order to compensate for unexpected increases in interest rates. In reality, debt relief came
ten years later, and what happened in those ten years had some influence on the final
agreement. Despite the delay, it is worth comparing the debt relief prescribed by the
model and the one observed in reality because the Brady agreements were in fact the
main relief solution to the crisis.
4.2 Debt relief according to the model
If the borrowing constraints of the Latin American countries were binding in 1979, then
the interest rate rise at the beginning of the 1980’s would have brought debt, d, above
its incentive compatible level. In this section, I compute the optimal debt reduction
prescribed by the model and compare it to the data.
Consider the model calibrated to represent the 1970’s and 1980’s. Suppose that world
interest rates may be either 0% or 4% a year and that each state lasts for an average of 10
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Table 1: Debt relief — Brady plan agreements, Cline (1995)
Venezuela 20%
Brazil 28%
Argentina 29%
Mexico 30%
Uruguay 31%
years: q∗h = 1.00, q∗l = 1.04−1, β = 1.02−1 and ψ = 0.10. Equation 3 yields the optimal
debt relief given a switch from the high state to the low:
∆d
d¯
=
1.00− 1.04−1
1− 1.02−1(1− 2× 0.10) = 0.178
That implies a spread over treasury of 1.8%22 when the state is high but debt relief of
18% when the state switches to low and interest rates jump from 0% to 4%. The result
holds for any γ > 0.
If β = (qh+ql)/2 then∆d/d¯ is not significantly aﬀected by the length of debt contracts.
For example, if interest rates switch between 0% and 4% and β = (1.02)−1, one-year
contracts and ψ = 0.1 yield
¡
dh − dl
¢
/d¯ = 0.1783. If, instead, there are five-year contracts
and ψ = 0.5 we obtain
¡
dh − dl
¢
/d¯ = 0.1781.
This result is robust to other interest rates processes. Using the auto-regressive process
and assuming a half-life of 3 years for the interest rate increase, the AR-1 coeﬃcient, ζ,
would be 0.79. A jump in real interest rates from 1% a year to 6% a year would then
imply even greater debt relief: ∆d/d¯ = 22.5%.
The decrease in the level of debt predicted by the model in response to an interest rate
increase of the magnitude observed in the data exceeds half the debt relief of the Brady
agreements.
On the other hand, a negative productivity shock would not generate results of similar
magnitude. A huge 10% reduction in productivity, assuming an average persistence of
10 years (ψ = 0.10) and world interest rates of 2% a year would imply debt reduction
slightly below 1% according to Equation 4.
22From the definition dh = d0 + ψ∆d. Data from 1973-80 show a spread over treasury of 1.4% for Brazil/Argentina and
1.1% for Mexico (Calvo and Kaminsky, 1991).
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4.3 Numerical results
In this section, the accuracy of the analytical approximations used in Section 4.2 is tested
using numerical simulations. The main results from this section are:
1. The formula in Proposition 6 is a good approximation for ∆d/d0 as long as the
borrowing constraint is binding in both states of the economy, mpk > r∗l;
2. If the borrowing constraint is binding and the level of capital is substantially below
its steady state level, then there are large gains from debt contracts designed to make
V h(k0, dh) = V l(k0, dl);
3. Regarding the Latin American debt crisis, if the marginal productivity of capital
in those countries was not lower than r∗l = 4%, the analytical results are good
approximations. Therefore, the sharp interest rate rise at the beginning of the 1980’s
would imply debt relief of more than half of the observed reduction obtained through
the Brady agreements. However, lower marginal productivity of capital (combined
with low adjustment costs for capital) reduces the debt relief prescribed by the model.
I want to obtain the values of ∆d/d0 that make V h(k0, dh) = V l(k0, dl) at every state
(k, d). The numerical solution is obtained through value function iteration. The state
space is discretised using grids for debt and capital but the planner can choose any point
in the grid. At the beginning of each iteration, ∆d is calculated to make V h(k0, dh) =
V l(k0, dl).
I use the same stylisation of the 1970’s and 1980’s to calibrate the model: one period
correspond to one year, α= 0.36, β = 1.02−1, γ = 0.01, σ = 3 and δ = 0.10. A = 1, and q∗
fluctuates around β: q∗l = 1.04−1 and q∗h = 1.00. I constrain k0−k to lie in some interval
– adjusment costs for capital are zero in that interval and infinity outside it. Figure
3 shows ∆d/d0 as a function of the marginal productivity of capital if the borrowing
constraint is binding and the state is high in two situations: (a) k0 − k ∈ (−0.10k, 0.10k)
and (b) k0 − k ∈ (−0.05k, 0.10k).
The main results are as follows:
• For mpk > 0.04 = r∗l, the linear approximation works well: ∆d/d0 is around 0.17
and gradually increasing in mpk. The possibility of borrowing an additional unit in
the high state is worth slightly more to countries with high mpk.
• For mpk below r∗l = 4%, ∆d/d0 is considerably smaller. For lower values of mpk,
when the state shifts to low, interest rates are higher than mpk, so the country sells
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Figure 3: Debt relief
capital and could even end up buying high-interest-rate foreign bonds. This sounds
unrealistic because adjustment costs for capital would prevent such rapid capital
movement. Indeed, the optimal ∆d/d0 for lower values of mpk are sensitive to the
assumptions on adjusment costs. Figure 3 shows that when mpk is at its lowest
value, k0 = k, then ∆d/d0 is around 0.10 with adjustment costs given by (a) and
around 0.11 in case (b).
The optimality of V l(k0, dl) = V h(k0, dh) is conditional on a binding borrowing con-
straint. If the constrint is not binding, then the condition becomes ∂V
h
pay(k
0,dh)
∂d =
∂V lpay(k
0,dl)
∂d
and the optimal contract in this case may prescribe very diﬀerent values of ∆d. The
numerical simulations show that for an unconstrained country, with high levels of k, im-
posing debt contracts that imply V l(k0, dl) = V h(k0, dh) at all states may be worse than
trading unconditional bonds.
If the country is constrained, then there are substantial potential gains from debt
contracts designed to make V h(k0, dh) = V l(k0, dl). With adjustment costs given by (a),
a country with k = 2 that holds its maximum incentive compatible level of debt and
has access only to unconditional bonds would be indiﬀerent between receiving a donation
equal to 8.3% of its initial capital level and gaining access to those contingent contracts.
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5 Policy discussion
According to the model in this paper, productivity fluctuations do not lead to significant
default, but fluctuations in world interest rates can generate debt relief that accounts
for a large proportion of what we observe in the data. In particular, the increase in US
interest rates in the beginning the 1980’s may account for more than half of the debt
relief obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.
Debt relief in this particular episode of sovereign default is not far from what an optimal
contract would prescribe.
However, such debt relief came with a 10-year delay. By analysing the optimal contract,
this paper does not consider the costly bargaining process that follows the announcement
of a sovereign default. Some recent policy prescriptions focus on such bargaining costs: the
IMF’s sovereign debt restructuring mechanims (SDRM) is an important example (Krueger
(2002)). The collective action clauses (CAC’s) aim at allowing creditors to quickly reduce
the level of debt when it goes above its incentive compatible level. That is a way to
implement the optimal contract.
Even if contingencies are implicitly considered, given the high costs of debt renegoti-
ations and defaults, it would be desirable to make such connection explicit in order to
save the heavy retaliation and bargaining costs – the recent dramatic fall in Argentinean
GDP after its default is just one example of such costs. At least in the case of the Latin
American debt crisis of the 1980’s, having debt explicitly contingent on world interest
rates would have avoided 10 years of costly bargaining.23
Many of the problems related to GDP-indexed bonds do not apply to contracts con-
tingent on world interest rates:
• there is no moral hazard: the country’s ‘eﬀort’ does not aﬀect its debt;
• there are no major measurement problems, danger of misreporting, data revisions, lag
in data announcements, we only need to estimate expected inflation in the relevant
developed countries;
• while countries’ GDP’s are positively correlated, r∗ and y∗ are negatively correlated.
As shown by Neumeyer and Perri (2005), interest rates and output are positively
correlated in developed countries but negatively correlated in emerging markets.24
23Following the Latin American debt crisis of the 80’s, many suggestions for indexing debt to some real economic variables
have been made. Some popular variables are GDP (Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) and Borenzstein and Mauro (2004) are
recent references) and commodities prices (Kletzer et al (1992)). Much of the discussion was about moral hazard issues
(Krugman, 1988): indexing debt to GDP would reduce incentives for governments to make eﬀort.
24Given these benefits from this type of contingent contract, the question of why it has not been implemented has yet to
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If default is never optimal, then limiting debt to “prudent” thresholds is a sensible
policy presciption (Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004)). However, in a world with large fluctua-
tions in the incentive compatible level of debt, occasional debt relief is part of the optimal
arrangement. Therefore, international lending contracts should allow for contingencies.
A Proofs
While proving the propositions in this paper, I often use the following method and I refer to it
as a first order Taylor approximation. Consider the following Value function:
V (x, y) = max
a,b,c
{u (x, y, a, b, c) + βV (x0(a, b, c), y0(a, b, c))}
So the values of a, b, c are chosen, which determine the next period’s x, y (denoted as a
convention by x0, y0). Take the function that is to be maximized:
f(x, y, a, b, c) = u (x, y, a, b, c) + βV (x0(a, b, c), y0(a, b, c))
Denote by a∗, b∗ and c∗ the maximizing values of V (x, y) and by a˜∗, b˜∗ and c˜∗ the maximizing
values of V (x˜, y˜). Then V (x, y) = f(x, y, a∗, b∗, c∗) and V (x˜, y˜) = f(x˜, y˜, a˜∗, b˜∗, c˜∗). Now, if (x, y)
and (x˜, y˜) are suﬃciently close, we can take the approximation of the maximand function with
respect to the variables to be chosen:
f(x, y, a∗, b∗, c∗) ≈ f(x˜, y˜, a˜∗, b˜∗, c˜∗) +
X
z=x,y,a,b,c
∂f(x˜, y˜, a˜∗, b˜∗, c˜∗)
∂z
(z∗ − z˜∗)
= V (x˜, y˜) +
X
z=x,y,a,b,c
Ã
∂u(x˜, y˜, a˜∗, b˜∗, c˜∗)
∂z
+ β
∂V (x˜0, y˜0)
∂z
!
(z∗ − z˜∗)
If there is a binding constraint on the possible values of a variable, then its maximized value
will be determined by the constraint. Otherwise, the envelope theorem applies and the derivative
of f with respect to that variable will be zero.
This method is diﬀerent from the general first order Taylor approximation: the original
function V (x, y) is not a function of the variables with respect to which the approximation is
done. This is why the maximand function has to be defined.
be answered. As argued by Borensztein and Mauro (2004), there may be many obstacles to innovations in sovereign debt,
for example: policy makers are usually considered to have short horizons and preferences diﬀerent than the agents; there
may be fixed costs to introduce a diﬀerent kind of debt – and so a free rider problem and, perhaps, an equilibrium in
which no-one pays the fixed cost. Last, the heavy bargaining costs are paid not only by creditors and debtors but also by
international organisations (e.g., the IMF), which reduces incentives for creditors and debtors to write contingent contracts.
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A.1 Proposition 1
Proof. The value functions in case of repayment and in case of default are maximized at (k0p, d0p)
and (k0d) respectively, which means that:
Vpay(k, d) = u(y + (1− δ)k − k0p − d+ qd0p) + βVpay(k0p, d0p)
Vdef (k, γ) = u(y + (1− δ)k − k0d − γy) + βVdef (k0d, γ)
When d = d0 = 0 and γ = 0, the value functions are identical in the two cases, V0(k). It is
maximized by choosing k0 = k0o.
Consider (k, d, γ) such that the country is indiﬀerent between repaying and choosing (k0p, d0)
or defaulting and choosing (k0d), which means that Vpay(k, d) = Vdef (k, γ). Approximate the
functions that are to be maximized,
fpay(d, k0, d0) = u(y + (1− δ)k − k0 − d+ qd0) + βVpay(k0, d0)
fdef (k
0, γ) = u(y + (1− δ)k − k0 − γy) + βVdef (k0, γ)
around V0(k). The first order Taylor approximation of these functions around V0(k) with
respect to (k0, d, d0) or (k0, γ) respectively yields
fpay(d, k0, d0) = Vpay(k, 0) +
∂fpay(0, k0o, 0)
∂d
(d− 0) + ∂fpay(0, k
0
o, 0)
∂d0
(d0 − 0)
+
∂fpay(0, k0o, 0)
∂k0
(k0 − k0o) +Ok,p
= V0(k) + u0(co)(−d+ qd0) + β
∂Vpay(k0o, 0)
∂d0
d0 +Ok,p
fdef (k
0, γ) = Vdef (k, 0) +
∂fdef (k0o, 0)
∂γ
(γ − 0) + ∂fdef (k
0
o, 0)
∂k0
(k0 − k0o) +Ok,d
= V0(k)− u0(co)γy + β
∂Vdef (k0o, 0)
∂γ
γ +Ok,d
Where I used that since
∂Vpay
∂k0
=
∂Vdef
∂k0
= 0 due to the Envelope condition for the un-
constrained maximization of Vpay and Vdef with respect to k0, their evaluation
∂Vpay(k, 0)
∂k0
=
∂Vdef (k, 0)
∂k0
= 0 as well. The optimal consumption with no borrowing, no punishment is denoted
by co = y + (1− δ)k − k0o. Furthermore, lim
(d,d0,k0)→(0,0,k0o)
Ok,p
kd,d0,k0k2 = 0 and lim(γ,k0)→(0,k0o)
Ok,p
kγ,k0k2 = 0.
Note that Vpay(k, d) = Vdef (k, γ) ⇐⇒ fpay(d, k0p, d0) = fdef (k0d, γ). Using the first order
Taylor expansions at points (d, k0p, d0) and (k0d, γ), we get:
u0(co)(−d+ qd0 + γy) + β
µ
∂Vpay(k0o, 0)
∂d0
d0 − ∂Vdef (k
0
o, 0)
∂γ
γ
¶
+ (Ok,p −Ok,d) = 0.
The last part is to show that
∂Vpay(k0o, 0)
∂d0
d0 − ∂Vdef (k
0
o, 0)
∂γ
γ is approximately zero.
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If k < k∗ then the country borrows the maximum level of incentive compatible debt. This
debt level makes the country indiﬀerent between repaying and defaulting at (k0p, d0):
Vpay(k0p, d
0) = Vdef (k0p, γ)
First order Taylor approximations of Vpay(k0p, d0) and Vdef (k0p, γ) around Vo(k0o) with respect
to only k0, d0 and γ yield:
Vpay(k0p, d
0) = V0(k0p) +
∂Vpay(k0o, 0)
∂k0
.(k0p − k0o) +
∂Vpay(k0o, 0)
∂d0
.d0 +Ok0(d02)
Vdef (k
0
p, γ) = V0(k
0
p) +
∂Vdef (k0o, 0)
∂k0
.(k0p − k0o) +
∂Vdef (k0o, 0)
∂γ
.γ +Ok0(γ
2)
Vpay(k0p, d0) = Vdef (k0p, γ) implies:
∂Vpay(k0p, 0)
∂d0
.d0 −
∂Vdef (k0p, 0)
∂γ
.γ ≈ 0
Using this last equation the diﬀerence of the original Taylor expansions simplifies to:
u0(co)
¡
−d+ qd0 + γy
¢
+ (Ok,p −Ok,d) ≈ 0
u0(co) 6= 0, and (Ok,p − Ok,d) is very small near (d, d0, k0) =
¡
0, 0, k0p
¢
and (γ, k0) = (0, k0d)
imply that
−d+ qd0 + γy = 0⇐⇒ d = qd0 + γy
Which yields the second part of the claim. In steady state, d = d0, and we get the first part
of the claim.
A.2 Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose s = h. If the borrowing constraint is not binding, the first order condition with
respect to ∆d yields:
β(1− ψ)
∂V hpay(k
0, d0 + ψ∆d)
∂d
ψ − βψ
∂V lpay(k
0, d0 − (1− ψ)∆d)
∂d
(1− ψ) = 0
which yields the claim. If s = l, a similar expression is obtained.
A.3 Proposition 3
Proof. Suppose s = h and k0, d0,∆d are such that V hpay(k0, dh) > V lpay(k0, dl). If the borrowing
constraint is binding, the country borrows up to the incentive compatible level (and there is
no debt repudiation in equilibrium), so V lpay(k
0, dl) = Vdef (k0). By increasing ∆d by dD, V lpay
increases and V hpay decreases. The borrowing constraint is no longer binding, so the country can
increase k0 by some dk0 and d0 by dk0/q∗h while still respecting the borrowing constraint.
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Consumption in the present period is unchanged. V l(k0, dl) changes by
u0(c0L).
h
dk0.(mpk − r∗h) + (1− ψ).dD
i
and V h(k0, dh) changes by
u0(c0H).
h
dk0.
³
mpk − r∗h
´
− ψ.dD
i
where c0L and c
0
H are consumption next period in the low and high state, respectively.
So the change in V h(k, d) equals:
β.
n£
ψu0(c0L) + (1− ψ)u0(c0H)
¤
dk0(mpk − r∗h) + ψ(1− ψ)dD
£
u0(c0L)− u0(c0H)
¤o
Now, if q∗h − q∗l is small enough, (u0(c0L)− u0(c0H)) is small and the change in V h(k, d) is
positive because mpk > r∗h.
Similar expressions can be derived if V lpay(k
0, dl) > V hpay(k0, dh) and/or if s = l.
A.4 Lemma 4
Before proving lemma 4, we need an auxiliary result:
Lemma 10 Consider the model with 2 states, h and l, and probability of changing state equal
to ψ. Define q¯ = (qh + ql)/2. In a first order approximation,
V (k, d, q¯) =
h
V (k, d, qh) + V (k, d, ql)
i
÷ 2
Proof. Proof: Comes directly from a Taylor expansion of V (k¯, d¯, qh) and V (k¯, d¯, ql) around
V (k¯, d¯, q¯).
We are ready to prove lemma 4.
Proof. First, we need to show that, close to the deteministic steady state (k = k¯, d = d¯),
V (k¯, d¯, qh) = V ξ(k¯, d¯, qh) if ξ = 1− 2ψ.
V ξ(k, d, qh) = max
k0,d0,∆d
(
u(Af(k) + (1− δ)k − k0 − d+ qhd0)
+β
£
(1− ξ)V det(k0, d0 − ξ∆d) + ξV ξ(k0, d0 + (1− ξ)∆d, qh)
¤ )
Near the deterministic steady state, choosing the optimal (d0, k0) instead of (d¯, k¯) has only second
order eﬀect on the value function V ξ. As a first order approximation, we can write:
V ξ(k, d, qh) = u(ch) + β
h
(1− ξ)V det(k, d− ξ∆d) + ξV ξ(k, d+ (1− ξ)∆d, qh)
i
V det
¡
k, d
¢
= u(c) + βV det(k, d)
where ch = Af(k)− δk − d(1− qh) and c = Af(k)− δk − d(1− q).
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Taking a first order Taylor approximation of fξ(k, d, qh,∆d) = V ξ(k, d, qh) around V det
¡
k, d
¢
(qh = q and ∆d = 0) with respect to q,∆d, we get:
V ξ(k, d, qh) ≈ u (c) + u0(c)(qh − q)d+ β
µ
V det(k, d) + (1− ξ)∂V
det(k, d)
∂d
(−ξ)(∆d− 0)
¶
+βξ
µ
∂V ξ(k, d, q)
∂d
(1− ξ)(∆d− 0) + ∂V
ξ(k, d, q)
∂q
(qh − q)
¶
= u (c) + u0(c)(qh − q)d+ βV det(k, d) + β(qh − q)ξ ∂V
ξ(k, d, q)
∂q
As a simple first order Taylor approximation,
∂V ξ(k, d, q)
∂q
(qh − q) = V ξ(k, d, qh) − V ξ(k, d, q),
so the above approximation can be written as:
V ξ(k, d, qh) = u (c) + u0(c)(qh − q)d+ βV det(k, d) + βξ
h
V ξ(k, d, qh)− V ξ(k, d, q)
i
Since V ξ(k, d, q) = V det(k, d) = u (c) + βV det(k, d),
V ξ(k, d, qh)− V det(k, d) = u0(c)(qh − q)d+ βξ
h
V ξ(k, d, qh)− V det(k, d)
i
so
V ξ(k, d, qh)− V det(k, d) = u
0(c)(qh − q)d
1− βξ (5)
Now, note that, as a first order approximation:
V (k¯, d¯, qh)− V det(k¯, d¯) = u0(c¯)
³
qh − q¯
´
d¯+ β
h
(1− ψ)V (k¯, d¯, qh) + ψV (k¯, d¯, ql)− V det(k¯, d¯)
i
= u0(c¯)
³
qh − q¯
´
d¯+ β(1− 2ψ)
h
V (k¯, d¯, qh)− V det(k¯, d¯)
i
the last equality follows from lemma 10. Then:
V (k¯, d¯, qh)− V det(k¯, d¯) =
u0(c¯)
¡
qh − q¯
¢
d¯
1− β(1− 2ψ) (6)
If ξ = 1− 2ψ, Equations (5) and (6) imply that V (k¯, d¯, qh) = V ξ(k¯, d¯, qh).
Now, we complete the proof by induction. Away from the steady state, we have:
V ξ(k, d, qh) = u(Af(k) + (1− δ)k − k0 − d+ qhd) + β
h
ξV ξ(k0, d0, qh) + (1− ξ)V det(k0, d0)
i
and
V (k, d, qh) = u(Af(k) + (1− δ)k − k0 − d+ qhd) + β
h
(1− ψ)V (k0, d0, qh) + ψV det(k0, d0)
i
If V ξ(k0, d0, qh) = V (k0, d0, qh), then, using lemma 10, we can write:
V (k, d, qh) = u(Af(k) + (1− δ)k − k0 − d+ qhd) + β
h
ξV ξ(k0, d0, qh) + (1− ξ)V det(k0, d0)
i
and thus V ξ(k, d, qh) = V (k, d, qh).
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A.5 Lemma 5
Proof. Subscripts denote time (k0 is capital at time 0). The superscript ξ for t > 0 means that
at time t− 1, when the variable (k or d) has been chosen, q∗ = q∗ξ.
V ξ(k0, d
ξ
0, q
ξ) = max
kξ1,d
ξ
1,∆d
(
u(Af(ko) + (1− δ)ko − kξ1 − d
ξ
0 + q
∗ξdξ1)
+β[(1− ξ)V det(kξ1, d
ξ
1 − ξ∆d) + ξV ξ(k
ξ
1, d
ξ
1 + (1− ξ)∆d, q∗ξ)]
)
again define the function to be maximized:
f(k0, d
ξ
0, q
ξ, kξ1, d
ξ
1,∆d) = u(Af(ko) + (1− δ)ko − k
ξ
1 − d
ξ
0 + q
∗ξdξ1)
+β[(1− ξ)V det(kξ1, d
ξ
1 − ξ∆d) + ξV ξ(k
ξ
1, d
ξ
1 + (1− ξ)∆d, q∗ξ)]
and take a Taylor approximation with respect to k1, d0, d1, q,∆d around q = q, d = d0, ∆d = 0
that is when f () = V det(k0, d0).
V ξ(k0, d
ξ
0, q
∗ξ) = f(k0, d
ξ
0, q
∗ξ, kξ1, d
ξ
1,∆d)
≈ u(Af(ko) + (1− δ)ko − k1 − d0 + qd1) + β
h
(1− ξ)V det(k1, d1) + ξV ξ(k1, d1, q)
i
+
∂f(k0, d0, q, k1, d1, 0)
∂k1
(kξ1 − k1) +
∂f(k0, d0, q, k1, d1, 0)
∂d0
(dξ0 − d0)
+
∂f(k0, d0, q, k1, d1, 0)
∂d1
(dξ1 − d1) +
∂f(k0, d0, q, k1, d1, 0)
∂q
(q∗ξ − q)
+
∂f(k0, d0, q, k1, d1, 0)
∂∆d
(∆d− 0)
= V det(k0, d0) + βξ[V
ξ(k1, d1, q)− V det(k1, d1)] + u0(c0)[−(dξ0 − d0) + q(d
ξ
1 − d1) + d1(q∗ξ − q)]
+β
∂V det(k1, d1)
∂d1
n
(1− ξ)[(dξ1 − d1)− ξ(∆d− 0)]
o
+β
∂V ξ(k1, d1, q)
∂d1
n
ξ[(dξ1 − d1) + (1− ξ)(∆d− 0)]
o
+ βξ
∂V ξ(k1, d1, q)
∂q
(q∗ξ − q)
Where I used that V det(k0, d0) = u(Af(ko) + (1− δ)ko − k1 − d0 + qd1) + βV det(k1, d1).
Note that as a first order Taylor approximation:
V ξ(k1, d1, q
∗ξ) = V ξ(k1, d1, q) + β
∙
(1− ξ)∂V
det(k1, d1)
∂q
+ ξ
∂V ξ(k1, d1, q)
∂q
¸
(q∗ξ − q)
= V ξ(k1, d1, q) + βξ
∂V ξ(k1, d1, q)
∂q
(q∗ξ − q)
Vhen q = q, V det(k1, d1) = V ξ(k1, d1, q) and
∂V det(k1, d1)
∂d1
=
∂V ξ(k1, d1, q)
∂d1
. Using these last
equations I get:
V ξ(k0, d
ξ
0, q
∗ξ)− V det(k0, d0) = u0(c0)[−(dξ0 − d0) + q(d
ξ
1 − d1) + d1(q∗ξ − q)]
+β
∂V ξ(k1, d1, q)
∂d1
(dξ1 − d1) + βξ[V ξ(k1, d1, q∗ξ)− V det(k1, d1)].
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Analogously, for t > 0 and starting with equal initial debts at both states, we get:
V ξ(kt, dt, q
∗ξ)− V det(kt, dt) = u0(ct)[q(dξt+1 − dt+1) + dt+1(q∗ξ − q)]
+β
∂V ξ(kt+1, dt+1, q)
∂dt+1
(dξt+1 − dt+1)
+βξ[V ξ(kt+1, dt+1, q
∗ξ)− V det(kt+1, dt+1)]
Recursive substitution leads to
V ξ(k0, d
ξ
0, q
∗ξ)− V det(k0, d0) = −u0(c0)(dξ0 − d0)
+
∞X
t=0
(βξ)t
∙
u0(ct)[q(dξt+1 − dt+1) + dt+1(q∗ξ − q)] + β
∂V det(kt+1, dt+1)
∂dt+1
(dξt+1 − dt+1)
¸
Imposing V ξ(k0, d
ξ
0, q
∗ξ) = V det(k0, d0) we get the claim.
A.6 Proposition 6
Proof. Using Lemma 4 and Equation 2:
V (k¯, dh, q∗h) = V (k¯, d¯, q¯)⇒
V ξ(k¯, dh, q∗h) = V (k¯, d¯, q¯)⇒
dh − d¯
d¯
=
q∗h − q¯
1− β(1− 2ψ)
.Analogously, V (k¯, dl, q∗l) = V (k¯, d¯, q¯)⇒
dl − d¯
d¯
=
q∗l − q¯
1− β(1− 2ψ)
. Using both equations, we get the claim.
A.7 Proposition 7
Proof. Consider a Taylor approximation of V AR(k, di, q∗i) around the deterministic steady state
(V det(k, d, q)). The borrowing constraint is not binding, so choosing the optimal (d0, k0) instead
of (k, d) has only second order eﬀects on the value function V AR. As a first order approximation,
we can write:
V AR(k, di, q∗i) = E
Ã ∞X
t=0
βtu
¡
Af(kt) + (1− δ)kt − kt+1 − dit + q∗idit+1
¢!
≈
∞X
t=0
βtu(c) +E
Ã ∞X
t=0
βtu0(c)d(q∗it − q)
!
− u0(c)(di0 − d)
Where c = Af(k)− δk − (1− q)d.
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Looking at the middle part of this expression,
E
Ã ∞X
t=0
βtu0(c)d(q∗it − q)
!
= u0(c)d
£
(q∗i0 − q) +E
¡
β
¡
ζ(q∗i0 − q) + ε1
¢
+ β2
¡
ζ
¡
ζ(q∗i0 − q) + ε1
¢
+ ε2
¢
+ ...
¢¤
= u0(c)d
"
(q∗i0 − q)
∞X
t=0
(βζ)t +E
Ã ∞X
t=1
βtεt
1
1− βζ
!#
=
∞X
t=0
(βζ)t u0(c)d
¡
q∗i0 − q
¢
= u0(c)d
¡
q∗i0 − q
¢ 1
1− βζ
So:
V AR(k, di, q∗i) ≈
∞X
t=0
βtu(c) + u0(c)d
¡
q∗i0 − q
¢ 1
1− βζ − u
0(c)(di0 − d)
Now imposing V AR(k, d1, q∗1) = V AR(k, d2, q∗2), we get:
∞X
t=0
βtu(c) + u0(c)d
¡
q∗1 − q
¢ 1
1− βζ − u
0(c)(d1 − d)
=
∞X
t=0
βtu(c) + u0(c)d
¡
q∗2 − q
¢ 1
1− βζ − u
0(c)(d2 − d)
⇒ (d2 − d)− (d1 − d) = 1
1− βζ d
¡¡
q∗2 − q
¢
−
¡
q∗1 − q
¢¢
⇒ d2 − d1 = 1
1− βζ d(q
∗2 − q∗1)
⇒ d
2 − d1
d
=
q∗2 − q∗1
1− βζ
A.8 Proposition 8
Proof. Suppose s = h and k0, d0,∆d are such that V hpay(k0, dh) > V hdef (k
0, γ). If the borrowing
constraint is binding, the country borrows up to the incentive compatible level (and there is no
debt repudiation in equilibrium), so V lpay(k
0, dl) = Vdef (k0, γ). By increasing ∆d by dD, V lpay
increases and V hpay decreases. The borrowing constraint is no longer binding, so the country can
increase k0 by some dk0 and d0 by dk0/q∗ while still respecting the borrowing constraint.
Consumption in the present period is unchanged. V l(k0, dl) changes by
u0(c0L).
h
dk0.(Alf 0(k0)− δk0 − r∗) + (1− ψ).dD
i
and V h(k0, dh) changes by
u0(c0H).
h
dk0.
³
Ahf 0(k0)− δk0 − r∗
´
− ψ.dD
i
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where c0L and c
0
H are consumption next period in the low and high state, respectively.
So the change in V h(k, d) equals β times:
dk0
h
ψu0(c0L)(A
lf 0(k0)− δk0 − r∗) + (1− ψ)u0(c0H)(Ahf 0(k0)− δk0 − r∗)
i
+ψ(1−ψ)dD
£
u0(c0L)− u0(c0H)
¤
Now, if Ah − Al is small enough, (u0(c0L)− u0(c0H)) is small and the change in V h(k, d) is
positive because the marginal productivity of capital is larger than r∗.
Similar expressions can be derived if V lpay(k
0, dl) > V ldef (k
0, dh) and/or if s = l.
A.9 Proposition 9
Proof. Consider that productivity follows the ξ-process, so that A0 = Aξ and for t > 0:
• if At−1 = Aξ, Pr(A = Aξ) = ξ and Pr(A = A¯) = 1− ξ;
• if At−1 = A¯, At = A¯.
The value function at (k, d) if At = Aξ is:
V ξ(k, d,Aξ) = max
k0,d0,d0ξ
n
u (c) + β
h
(1− ξ)V det(k0, d0) + ξV ξ(k0, d0ξ, Aξ)
io
where c = Aξf(k) + (1− δ)k− k0 − d+ q∗(d0(1− ξ) + ξd0ξ) and V det is the value function in the
model with no uncertainty.
A Taylor approximation of V ξ(k, d,Aξ) around the deterministic steady state (V det(k, d))
yields:
V ξpay(k, d,A
ξ) = u(c) + u0(c)(Aξ − A¯)f(k) + β(1− ξ)V det(k, d) + βξV ξ(k, d,Aξ)
where c = A¯f(k)− δk − (1− q∗)d.
So:
V ξpay(k, d,A
ξ)− V det(k, d) = u0(c)(Aξ − A¯)f(k) + βξ
h
V ξpay(k, d,A
ξ)− V det(k, d)
i
which yields:
V ξpay(k, d,A
ξ) = V det(k, d) +
u0(c)(Aξ − A¯)f(k)
1− βξ
If dξ is close to d, V ξpay(k, dξ, Aξ) can be written as:
V ξpay(k, d
ξ, Aξ) = V det(k, d) +
u0(c)(Aξ − A¯)f(k)
1− βξ − u
0(c)
³
dξ − d
´
(7)
Out of the equilibrium path, the value function conditional on default is:
V ξdef (k, γ,A
ξ) = max
k0
n
u (c) + β
h
(1− ξ)V detdef (k0, γ) + ξV
ξ
def (k
0, γ,Aξ)
io
where c = (1 − γ)Aξf(k) + (1 − δ)k − k0 and V detdef is the value function in the model with no
uncertainty if the country decides to default.
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A Taylor approximation of V ξdef (k, γ,A
ξ) around the deterministic steady state (V detdef (k, γ))
yields:
V ξdef (k, γ,A
ξ) = u(cd) + u
0(cd)(Aξ − A¯)(1− γ)f(k) + β(1− ξ)V detdef (k, γ) + βξV
ξ
def (k, γ,A
ξ)
where cd = (1− γ)A¯f(k)− δk, which yields:
V ξdef (k, γ,A
ξ) = V detdef (k, γ) +
u0(cd)(1− γ)(Aξ − A¯)f(k)
1− βξ (8)
Using an argument similar to Lemma 4, if ξ = 1 − 2ψ and fluctuations of technology are
small, V h(k, d,Ah) = V ξ(k, d,Ah) and an argument similar to Proposition 8 shows that if the
country is constrained, in the optimal contract, dξ and d are such that V ξpay(k0, dξ) = V ξdef (k
0, γ)
and V detpay (k
0, d) = V detdef (k
0, γ). We want to know the values of dξ and d that make such equalities
hold when we are close to the deterministic steady state.
Using Equations 7 and 8, V detpay (k, d) = V
det
def (k, γ) imply:
V ξpay(k, d
ξ, Aξ) = V ξdef (k, γ,A
ξ)− u
0(cd)(1− γ)(Aξ − A¯)f(k)
1− βξ
+
u0(c)(Aξ − A¯)f(k)
1− βξ − u
0(c)
³
dξ − d
´
= V ξdef (k, γ,A
ξ) +
[γu0(c) + u0(c)− u0(cd)] (Aξ − A¯)f(k)
1− βξ − u
0(c)
³
dξ − d
´
From Proposition 1:
V detpay (k, d) = V
det
def (k, γ)⇒ d =
γAf(k)
1− q∗
which implies cd = c.
So V ξpay(k, dξ, Aξ) = V
ξ
def (k, γ,A
ξ) if:
(1− q∗)d
A¯f(k)
u0(c)
(Aξ − A¯)f(k)
1− βξ = u
0(c)
³
dξ − d
´
⇒
(1− q∗)d
1− βξ
(Aξ − A¯)
A¯
= dξ − d
Using ξ = 1 − 2ψ and substituting
¡
Aξ, dξ
¢
for
¡
Ah, dh
¢
and
¡
Al, dl
¢
we get 2 equations
that relate debt and productivity at each of the two states. Combining both equations, we get
Equation 4.
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